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Despite the exponential development of environmental policies, environmental 
problems persist and are constantly evolving. !ere is, clearly, a distance between 
the abstraction of rules and the concreteness of action. Going beyond the de-
politicization and institutional determinism that environmental policy analysis 
o"en conveys, this article suggests that the analysis should be re-politicized in 
order to understand these gaps. Based on this reasoning, the concept of “law 
activation strategy” (LAS) is proposed as a social mechanism to analyze the 
complex interplay between legal rules, actors’ behaviors, and environmental 
outcomes. Embedded within political games and asymmetric power relations, 
LAS cover the various positions that actors may take with regards to the rules 
that structure their action: concretization, passivity, diversion, circumvention, 
and innovation. !e concept is integrated to a broader analytical framework 
and applied to an empirical case study related to aquatic ecosystem protection 
in Switzerland. By doing so, the paper demonstrates the explanatory power 
of LAS and its pertinence in providing a more political understanding of 
environmental policymaking.
Keywords: environmental policy analysis, de-politicization, institutional 
determinism, actors and institutions, political games, law activation strategies
Introduction
A dried-out river at the height of summer, when withdrawals are at their maximum; a signi!cantly 
and durably degraded ecosystem due to 
massive use of pesticides; an exceedingly 
high concentration of ozone and particles 
in a zone saturated with motorized trans-
port: examples of human-caused environ-
mental issues are with no end. Despite 
the exponential development of environ-
mental policies since the 1970s (Knoepfel 
1992), these issues not only persist, but 
are constantly progressing (e.g., Gleick 
et al. 2009; IPCC 2014). Discourses have 
evolved, legal rules have been adopted, 
and considerable e"orts have been en-
gaged without, however, producing the 
expected impacts. Clearly, the question 
arises as how to explain these gaps be-
tween rules and concrete situations on 
the !eld.
 At least three perspectives have 
been mobilized in the environmental 
policy literature in order to explain these 
gaps. #e most recent standpoint—sub-
sumed here under the generic label of 
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environmental governance (Jordan, Wur-
zel, and Zito 2003; Lemos and Agrawal 
2006)—focuses on the “wicked” nature 
of environmental problems, the new 
equilibrium between state and non-state 
actors, and the necessity to move be-
yond traditional forms of government. 
Traditional top-down instruments are 
perceived as inappropriate to address 
such issues and changes in the nature of 
environmental policies are proposed. A 
second perspective deals with the factors 
that may disturb a straightforward, ef-
fective implementation (implementation 
studies, which date back to Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1973). Focusing on existing 
policies, this approach generally proposes 
recommendations to increase goal com-
pliance. #e institutional analysis and de-
velopment (IAD) framework developed 
by Ostrom and her colleagues represents 
the third prominent approach. Rooted in 
rational choice institutionalism (Ostrom 
2007a), its application generally results in 
deductive models of individual decision 
making, on the basis of which predictions 
about environmental outcomes and/or in-
stitutional design principles are proposed.
 Although they shed light on rele-
vant dimensions and drivers of the policy 
process, the three above-described per-
spectives can be criticized for not fully 
accounting for the political dimension of 
environmental policymaking. Implemen-
tation is commonly assumed and the fact 
that actors may decide to adopt strategies 
of diversion, circumvention, or passivity 
with regards to the rules that structure 
their action is rarely referred to. Although 
they focus on the interplay between in-
stitutions (including legal rules), actors, 
and environmental outcomes, these ap-
proaches share a form of institutional 
determinism (Radaelli, Dente, and Dossi 
2012). #ey leave underspeci!ed the so-
cial mechanisms (Hedström and Ylikoski 
2010) through which institutions shape 
actors’ behaviors and see their in$uence 
on environmental outcomes mediated.
 Yet in environmental policy as 
in other policy areas, it is clear from the 
point of view of various disciplines that 
courses of action rarely follow mechani-
cally the paths set out by legal rules. Sem-
inal approaches from sociology (e.g., Cro-
zier and Friedberg 1977; Bourdieu 1990; 
Lascoumes 1990) and policy analysis 
(e.g., Scharpf 1997; Jessop 2001; Knoepfel 
et al. 2011; Lubell 2013) have emphasized 
the complex interplay between rules and 
actors. #e latter should not be seen as the 
empty recipients of prescriptions they are 
eager to bring into life in the real world. 
Quite the contrary, actors necessarily 
need, for a given rule to produce its ef-
fects, to translate its abstract provisions at 
the level of action. Far from being mech-
anistic or linear, this process is highly po-
litical.
 Bridging these various approach-
es, the present article assumes that the 
gaps between legal rules and environmen-
tal outcomes are the result of political pro-
cesses, within which actors adopt com-
peting strategies with regards to the rules 
that structure their action (i.e., competing 
law activation strategies, LAS). #ese LAS 
represent, in other words, a conceptual 
attempt to unfold the social mechanisms 
through which the in$uence of legal rules 
on environmental outcomes is mediated. 
A three-step argumentation is provided 
in order to evaluate this assumption. #e 
!rst part identi!es two limitations that 
are common to most environmental gov-
ernance, implementation, and IAD-relat-
ed approaches: an evacuation of politics 
(leading to the de-politicization of envi-
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ronmental stakes) and an assumption of 
implementation (leading to institutional 
determinism). Building on these short-
comings, a re-politicization of environ-
mental policy analysis is argued for. #is 
will be done in the second part, which 
develops the notion of LAS as a crucial 
mechanism linking legal rules to envi-
ronmental outcomes. LAS describe the 
strategies by which actors select the rules 
and modalities of activation they perceive 
as the most appropriate to reach their ob-
jectives. Re$ections around the concep-
tual roots of LAS as well as an analytical 
framework aiming to understand their ef-
fects on environmental outcomes are pro-
posed. #e framework is, in a third part, 
applied to a case study on aquatic ecosys-
tem protection in the Swiss Alps. Finally, 
the explanatory power of the framework 
is discussed and avenues for future re-
search are proposed.
Environmental policy analysis: to-
ward a re-politicization
Environmental Governance approaches
The dominant perspective among policy scholars seems to be, now-adays, to explain the persistence of 
environmental problems by insisting on 
the inappropriateness of existing policies. 
Schematically, the reasoning proceeds as 
follows. Environmental problems are, in 
the !rst step, presented as wicked and 
uncommonly di%cult to tackle with tra-
ditional policy instruments (Levin et al. 
2012). Keys to this viewpoint are the al-
legedly ambivalence, uncertainty and com-
plexity of environmental problems, and 
the myopic nature of environmental poli-
cies in that respect (Varone et al. 2013). At 
the light of these facts, drastic changes in 
the nature of environmental policies are 
promoted, and a vast array of approaches 
proposed: social resilience (Adger 2000), 
adaptive co-management (Olsson, Folke, 
and Hahn 2004), transition management 
(Kemp, Loorbach, and Rotmans 2007), 
network governance (Carlsson and Sand-
ström 2008), collaborative governance 
(Ansell and Gash 2008), etc.
 Pivotal to these approaches is a fo-
cus on the “good” design of policies. Echo-
ing broader trends emphasizing the emer-
gence of an era of governance (Rhodes 
1997), policy instruments that di"er from 
the state-centered, “command and con-
trol” perspective are identi!ed and called 
for (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2003). If 
environmental governance is as varied in 
form as ubiquitous in spread (Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006), it generally sees $exibility, 
collaboration, and social learning as well 
suited to handle environmental pressures. 
Emphasis is put on the ways social actors 
can cooperate, learn, and adapt together; 
and on the design of policy instruments 
that will favor such endeavors. By doing 
so, these approaches bring in “new sites, 
new actors, and new themes” (Hajer and 
Wagenaar 2003, 3) and provide sever-
al relevant theories “for understanding 
changing processes of governing” (Stoker 
1998, 18). #e bulk of these studies also 
perpetrate, however, two tendencies that 
are problematic when it comes to the po-
litical understanding of environmental 
policymaking.
 #ey are, !rstly, characterized by 
an evacuation of politics that leaves them 
oblivious to dynamics of power, con$icts, 
and bargaining (Hornborg 2009; O"e 
2009). Not only are power relations not 
fully accounted for, but “the nasty and 
dark side of the political that may disturb 
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rational problem solving” is also blocked 
out (Voss and Bornemann 2011, 7). A pre-
sumption of consensus is widespread and 
the fact that actors may pursue diverging 
interests and may not be willing to coop-
erate or learn together is, to a large extent, 
put aside. By doing so, the environmen-
tal governance perspective participates 
to a de-politicization of environmental 
questions that is also present in political 
discourses or mainstream media (Swyn-
gedouw 2009; Kenis and Lievens 2014). 
Because somehow we are all concerned, 
environmental politics is supposed to 
have translated into a form of political 
consensus.
 An assumption of implementa-
tion is, secondly, largely widespread. It 
consists in assuming that new policy in-
struments will be implemented without 
providing any insights on the process 
through which this implementation will 
occur. #e leitmotiv has been to insist 
on good policy design without much con-
sideration for what happens a&erwards. 
How the innovative instruments that are 
proposed should translate into environ-
mental outcomes remains, to a wide ex-
tent, unexplored (see Jordan and Huitema 
2014, who recently undertook to !ll this 
gap). #is shortcoming sometime comes 
with a “trivialization of obstacles to im-
plementation” (Hornborg 2009, 252) and 
can also be referred to as “the promise of 
new modes of governance” (Bäckstrand et 
al. 2010).
Implementation studies
 Policy implementation scholars 
provide a second, although somehow out-
of-fashion (Hupe 2014), perspective to 
explore the persistence of environmental 
problems. Focusing on the “missing link” 
(Hargrove 1975), the “gap” (Dunsire 1978) 
between legal expectations and concrete 
realizations, they explore the processes 
that have to be gone through to turn rules 
into action. By doing so, these scholars 
certainly contributed to open “the black 
box of policymaking” (Palumbo and 
Calista 1990, 14). Formerly considered as 
purely mechanical, the “implementation 
stage” became a research object in its own 
right, leading to a wide and eclectic range 
of frameworks, theories, and models 
(Winter 2012; Hill and Hupe 2014). On 
some level however, it can be argued that 
the “link is still missing” (Robichau and 
Lynn 2009, 22). #e way implementation 
studies have developed prevented them, 
in particular, to fully grasp the political 
dimension of policy processes. Most im-
plementation studies share, more speci!-
cally, the two tendencies already outlined 
above with regards to environmental gov-
ernance approaches.
 On the one hand, although an 
implementation perspective should have 
contributed to bring “politics back into 
policy analysis” (Scho!eld 2001, 247), 
most studies seem to have reduced this 
political dimension to the smallest share. 
Implementation studies have o&en been 
practiced as a “governing-elite phenom-
enon” (deLeon and deLeon 2002, 468), 
looking at what should happen (and what 
is preventing it from happening) rather 
than at what is actually happening. #e 
orientation is straightforward and top-
down (Hupe 2011) and the bottom-up 
challenge that emerged in the 80s (Barrett 
and Fudge 1981; Hjern and Hull 1982) 
generally ignored. From the beginning, 
these studies have sought to highlight 
“the numbers of factors that may adverse-
ly a"ect implementation” (Ingram 1990, 
465). #e focus is on the ambiguity of pol-
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icy goals, the number of decision points 
or the quality of leadership instead of on 
power relations, diverging interests, and 
other actorial dimensions. #is emphasis 
on factors rather than on actors contribut-
ed to hide the political realities of policies 
and to create an arti!cial “separation be-
tween politics and administration” (Bar-
rett 2004, 254).
 An assumption of implementation 
is, secondly, largely widespread. It consists 
in assuming that once a rule is adopted, 
“actors are raring to go and implement” 
(Scho!eld 2001, 259). Frequently framed 
in managerialist terms, implementation 
studies consider action mainly as a prob-
lem of transmission and application of 
legislative provisions decided at the top 
(Barrett and Fudge 1981, 4). #e fact that 
actors may ignore what to do or decide 
to adopt strategies of diversion, circum-
vention, or passivity is largely ignored. 
#e focus is on “goal compliance” (Win-
ter 2012) and a rather pessimistic tone is 
widespread.
Rational choice institutionalism and the 
IAD framework
 #e IAD framework (Ostrom 
2007a) represents a third prominent ap-
proach that has been employed to study the 
relationship between institutions, actors, 
and environmental outcomes. Harmoni-
ous with most environmental governance 
theories (some of them being explicitly 
grounded in the framework), broader and 
more systematic than implementation 
studies, it has been widely—and fruit-
fully—applied to analyze environmental 
politics. Rooted in rational choice insti-
tutionalism, the framework focuses on a 
given action arena, composed of a speci!c 
set of actors located within a speci!c ac-
tion situation (described in terms of posi-
tions, actions, access to information, etc.). 
#ese actors are a"ected by several exter-
nal variables (including “rules in use”) and 
enter in patterns of interactions that gen-
erate diverging environmental outcomes.
 By contrast to the two above-men-
tioned approaches, the IAD framework 
and some of its emanations—e.g., com-
mon-pool resources (CPR) theories—
strongly focus on actors’ actions and inter-
actions when explaining environmental 
outcomes. As some have already reasoned 
(e.g., Dupuis and Knoepfel 2015), how-
ever, it appears necessary to depart from 
some assumptions that the framework 
perpetrates in order to fully understand 
the political nature of environmental pol-
icymaking. #ese assumptions consist, 
again, in two trends: toward de-politici-
zation and toward institutional determin-
ism.
 #e framework largely omits, in 
line with most rational choice approach-
es, the role of asymmetric power relations 
and con$icting interests in environmen-
tal politics (Clement 2010; Dupuis and 
Knoepfel 2015). Adopting the premises of 
positivism and methodological individu-
alism (Johnson 2004), it relies on deduc-
tive models of individual decision making 
in order to propose design principles for 
more robust institutions. It fails, by do-
ing so, to consider the power dynamics 
and the plurality of beliefs and interests 
at work. #ose are not necessarily ignored 
but, clearly, maintained at the periphery 
of the analysis. Take for instance the CPR 
theories: they o"er a view of local commu-
nities as homogenous and a-con$ictual 
when, in reality, these communities repre-
sent arenas of competitions, inequalities, 
and exclusion (Johnson 2004; Schweizer 
2013).
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 Institutions are, as a result, mainly 
considered as structures of cooperation. 
#e framework perpetrates an instrumen-
tal view (Sondershaus and Moss 2014) that 
does not tell much about institutions as 
structures—and stakes—of power (Moe 
2005). #is particular approach to institu-
tions results in a tendency to exaggerate 
their explanatory power and to consider 
well-designed institutions as panaceas (Os-
trom 2007b), producing causal reduction-
ism (Dupuis and Knoepfel 2015) and insti-
tutional determinism (Radaelli, Dente, and 
Dossi 2012). #e role of actors in the use of 
the law is, as a result, largely downplayed. 
Rules are considered as “outside the possi-
bility of actors to use them in a di"erentiat-
ed way” (Radaelli, Dente, and Dossi 2012, 
546) and an assumption of implementation 
is, again, widespread.
A need for re-politicization 
 All three perspectives convey, in 
sum, an oblivion of power dynamics and 
an assumption of implementation that lead 
to a form of institutional determinism. In 
spite of their (common) goal of analyzing 
the interplay between institutions, actors, 
and environmental outcomes, these ap-
proaches fail to provide a thorough view 
of the mechanisms through which insti-
tutions shape actors’ behaviors and see 
their e"ects on environmental outcomes 
mediated. To the contrary, they contrib-
ute to feed the myth of an apolitical form 
of policies, technocratic and orientated by 
rational problem solving (deLeon 1994). 
#ey echo what Torgerson (1986) framed 
as the “!rst face” of policy analysis, char-
acterized by the old “dream of the aboli-
tion of politics—of putting an end to the 
strife and confusion of human society in 
favor of an orderly administration of things 
based upon objective knowledge” (p. 34). 
Environmental policymaking, because it 
is legitimated by a supposed political con-
sensus (Swyngedouw 2009) and because 
nature is o&en represented as “external to 
the social” (Kenis and Lievens 2014, 538), 
is particularly exposed to this risk.
 #e present paper makes the as-
sumption that, to the contrary, environ-
mental policy analysis should be re-polit-
icized in order to understand the complex 
processes through which legal rules im-
pinge on actors’ behaviors and environ-
mental outcomes. Rather than ignoring the 
political dimension of policymaking, it is 
argued that environmental policy analysis 
would bene!t from paying more attention 
to power relations, diverging interests and 
strategies, and other actorial variables that 
are at the core of these processes. Institu-
tions a"ect reality only because actors me-
diate and materialize their e"ects in their 
day-to-day interactions. #ey are not just 
“abstract entities” (Peters 2011, 38), but 
complex webs of constraints and opportu-
nities.
 Environmental policymaking 
should, in that sense, be considered as a cir-
cular and continuous process of normative 
creation (Lascoumes 1990). It is political 
“through and through”, with every step be-
ing the “outcome of political give and take” 
(Wagenaar 2015, 248). In that respect, the 
implementation of rules is as challenging 
as their adoption. It does not represent a 
common quest to reach the best possible 
outcome but, to the contrary, a contested 
scene where competing rationalities, inter-
ests, and strategies may arise. In the end, 
the outcomes that will be reached depend 
on the con!guration of the involved actors, 
on the nature of their power relations, and, 
last but not least, on what these actors actu-
ally do (i.e., on the strategies they pursue).
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 Following that line of thought, the 
paper argues that policy scholars’ contribu-
tion to the understanding of environmen-
tal policymaking should lie in the system-
atic account of these actorial driving forces, 
in general, and of the social mechanisms 
through which institutions shape actors’ 
behaviors and environmental outcomes, 
in particular. A focus on the strategies that 
actors pursue with regards to the legal rules 
that structure their action (LAS, see below) 
is seen as particularly relevant. It supposes, 
!rst, to put the political side of environ-
mental policymaking at the center of the 
analysis, and second, to break o" with in-
stitutional determinism by going beyond 
the widespread assumption of implemen-
tation.
Law activation strategies (LAS) 
within political games
In the following sections, a framework is proposed around the concept of LAS. #e goal is to provide a political frame 
of intelligibility to understand why and 
how gaps between legal rules and environ-
mental outcomes emerge. #e analytical 
framework and its basic assumptions are 
presented in a !rst step. #en the concep-
tual roots of LAS are detailed and a typol-
ogy is proposed. Finally, the implications 
of LAS for environmental outcomes are 
apprehended through the concept of local 
regulatory arrangements (LRA).
Basic assumptions and broad analytical 
framework
 #e explanatory scheme adopted 
in the framework is not causal, but actori-
al (Berthelot 1990). Rather than on direct 
causal explanations, the focus is on the di-
versity of variables and social mechanisms 
that play a role in understanding the inter-
play between legal rules, actors’ behaviors, 
and environmental outcomes. #e frame-
work relies, more precisely, on three basic 
assumptions that converge to place the no-
tion of LAS at its center.
 First, in line with bottom-up imple-
mentation scholars, the policy-action rela-
tionship is regarded “as a process of inter-
action and negotiation” (Barrett and Fudge 
1981, 21). Rather than by a given formal 
rule, actors are bound together by a speci!c 
environmental problem that only some of 
them want to solve (Hjern and Hull 1982). 
It is, therefore, the problem as socially con-
structed that represents the starting point 
of their action. #e problem in question 
is not an objective and expert-based phe-
nomenon; rather, it is based on subjective 
perceptions of the reality (Scharpf 1997)—
an alleged risk of water or air pollution; a 
site seen as contaminated; a resource per-
ceived as over-exploited—and involves 
trade-o"s between competing interests.
 Institutions are, second, considered 
as important elements of context (Peters 
2011). In political systems based on the 
rule of law, the legal rules adopted by pub-
lic authorities represent a particularly im-
portant institutional corpus (Gerber et al. 
2009). If, however, policy designs (i.e., pub-
lic law) certainly matter in explaining why 
and how changes happen, their explanatory 
power should not be overestimated. #ey 
represent only one of the bodies of law that 
in$uence environmental collective action. 
Constitutional rules, as well as private law 
(e.g., property rights regimes) also play 
an important role (Schlager and Ostrom 
1992). In fact, environmental problems are 
a"ected by an ever increasing mass of rules 
that are not necessarily consistent (Gerber 
et al. 2009).
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 #ere is always, in addition, a 
scope for maneuver (Bourdieu 1990; Jes-
sop 2001) for implementing agents and 
social actors. Formal law acts as a set of 
constraints and opportunities that shape 
actors’ behaviors, restraining action with-
out determining it. On the one hand, rules 
impinge on social processes by a"ect-
ing actors’ perceptions and preferences 
(Scharpf 1997), by attributing action re-
sources (Knoepfel et al. 2011), and by fa-
voring speci!c courses of action. On the 
other hand however, they do not in$uence 
outcomes mechanically but represent a 
system of potentialities for the involved ac-
tors (Lascoumes 1990). Public as well as 
social actors can very well activate rules 
strategically (Aubin 2008), as “weapons” 
(Bourdieu 1990, 91) to impose their worl-
dviews. #e concept of law activation re-
fers to such strategic behaviors.
 Actors bound by a speci!c prob-
lem and evolving within a speci!c frame 
of institutions engage—it is the third as-
sumption—in complex social processes. 
Developed in various approaches from 
political science (Scharpf 1997; Knoep-
fel et al. 2011; Lubell 2013) and sociology 
(Crozier and Friedberg 1977; Bourdieu 
1990), the idea of political games is put 
at the center of the analysis. It serves as 
a “master metaphor” (Bardach 1977, 56) 
that provides a “frame of attention and in-
terpretation” (Scharpf 1997, 7) to account 
for actors’ interactions, actions, and pow-
er relations (Crozier and Friedberg 1977, 
113). It is, as such, necessarily politically 
loaded. Concretely, the game image sup-
poses to decompose the processes of pol-
icymaking into three elements: the actors’ 
con!guration (which actors are playing 
and how do they interact?); their power 
relations (which cards do they hold?); and, 
!nally, the strategies they are pursuing 
(which cards do they play? Are they trying 
to cheat, to play in creative ways?).
 #e analytical framework that aris-
es from these assumptions is summarized 
in Figure 1. LAS are, in sum, developed 
with regards to a socially constructed en-
vironmental problem, shaped by a specif-
ic context of institutional constraints and 
opportunities, and embedded within po-
litical games. Analytically, they represent a 
social mechanism (Hedström and Ylikos-
ki 2010) through which institutions shape 
actors’ behaviors. #ey materialize in LRA 
(see below) and, in the end, contribute to 
in$uence environmental outcomes.
Law activation as a strategy
 #e notion of strategy has been 
developed by various strands of literature, 
from strategic analysis (Crozier and Fried-
berg 1977) and intentional explanation 
(Korpi 1985) to critical sociology (Bour-
dieu 1990; Lamaison and Bourdieu 1986), 
actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf 
1997) or strategic-relational approaches 
(Jessop 2001; Hay 2002). Bridging these 
contributions, a strategy is de!ned here 
as the intentional conduct by which ac-
tors evaluate, select and constantly adapt 
the course of their action to their environ-
ment, and to the behaviors of other actors. 
It describes, in other words, the way actors 
mobilize their power and their context of 
action in order to in$uence a policy pro-
cess. Five constitutive elements stem from 
this de!nition. A strategy supposes an 
intention, a selection (between potential 
courses of action), a dynamic (of anticipa-
tion and adaptation), an interaction (with 
other actors’ strategies), and an environ-
ment (within which it is to occur). #ese 
dimensions and their theoretical roots and 
implications are detailed in Table 1.
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 Building on that train of thoughts, 
law activation is considered as strategic 
because it implies the intentional selec-
tion of rules and modalities of activation 
in order to reach an objective, as well as 
the adaptation of the selected strategies in 
the course of political games. #e strate-
gic activation of rules is to be considered 
as a crucial dimension of actors’ actions 
in political systems based on the rule of 
law, where legal rules are continuously 
aggregated. #ese rules are, in real-world 
processes, subject of innumerable nego-
tiations around the forms of their imple-
mentation; some are not even activated, 
and others may very well be explicitly by-
passed or diverted.
 Following Bourdieu (1990, 91), 
LAS can be seen as a continuum going 
from strict and rigid implementation to 
plain and clear transgression. #e scope 
of possible LAS will, however, always 
depend on the subjective perceptions of 
the actor: some may perceive a scope for 
maneuver, while other may !ll a strong 
(e.g., social, cultural, or religious) pres-
sure toward implementation. #e choice 
will also be contingent on the other actors 
involved and on their respective strategic 
capacity (see Table 1). In an e"ort of sys-
tematization, Table 2 proposes !ve ideal 
types of LAS: passivity, concretization, 
diversion, circumvention, and innova-
tion. #ese ideal types represent a prop-
osition drawn from the literature (see the 
references in Table 2) and from empirical 
studies and discussions conducted within 
the research group “Resources and Insti-
tutional Regimes”1.
Local regulatory arrangement (LRA) and 
environmental outcomes
 LAS are considered as central 
mechanisms to understand how legal 
rules translate into environmental out-
comes. In a given empirical situation, 
the selected LAS will interact and be re-
Figure 1  Broad analytical framework around LAS
1 #is research group was constituted in the frame of doctoral seminars that gathered, between 2009 
and 2013, Ph.D. students and senior researchers from Swiss Universities that were working on environ-
mental issues in Switzerland and other parts of the world (France, Indonesia, India).
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Table 1  Constitutive dimensions of a strategy
Intention 
Strategies are the deeds of intentional actors, which choose to act in ways 
they believe to be means to their goals (Korpi 1985). A strategy is 
motivated by “the intention to realize certain outcomes and objectives” 
(Hay 2002, 129). It has a sense for the actor adopting it, because of more 
or less ambiguous and contradictory intentions, preferences, and 
motivations. Intentionality does not, however, concur with (economic) 
assumptions of omniscience or rational calculation. To the contrary, the 
notion applies indifferently to (hypothetically) rational and totally erratic 
behaviors (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). 
Selection 
Intentional actors make (more or less) conscious choices (Korpi 1985) in 
order to reach their objectives. A strategy is seen, in that sense, as 
involving a selection between potential (Hay 2002, 129) or feasible 
(Scharpf 1997, 73) courses of action. 
Dynamic 
Strategies are not frozen in time but constantly evolve to adapt to the 
perceptions, beliefs, and anticipations of the actor pursuing it. Actors’ 
preferences are, as well as their selected courses of action, constantly 
reviewed, revised, and reformed (Hay 2002). Intentions are not fixed, and 
actors may adjust their strategy to unforeseen events or to other actors’ 
behaviors. 
Interaction 
Strategies are intrinsically relational, “interactive” as Scharpf (1997, 36) 
putted it. They are linked to the action of other actors and, as such, are 
indivisible from dynamics of power and domination. They fall within 
complex webs of power, within which actors do not have an equivalent 
strategic capacity (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). 
Environment 
Strategies are always situated—territorially, socially, and institutionally. 
They do not arise from decontextualized, hyper-rational agent, but from 
social actors embedded within specific environments or social structures 
(Korpi 1985; Crozier and Friedberg 1977; Jessop 2001). These actors 
operate, in particular, “within institutional settings that, at the same time, 
enable and constrain these strategies” (Scharpf 1997, 36). Institutions are, 
in other words, both internalized and strategically weighed by actors. 
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!ned in the course of political processes 
of negotiation and bargaining. In the end, 
some actors will manage to impose their 
view and the process will (temporarily) 
come to an end. An “arrangement” will 
be reached that will “regulate” the issue 
with regards to the “local” situation at 
stake—hence the term of local regulatory 
arrangement.
 LRA represent, in other words, the 
output of actors’ games. #eir ambition is 
not to solve the environmental problem 
but rather to close the political games ini-
tiated around it. Bringing together a va-
riety of policy decisions (authorizations, 
sanctions, court decisions) or private 
agreements (contracts, oral agreements), 
LRA materialize a (temporary) consen-
sus around the problem. #ey are more 
or less coercive and necessarily discrim-
inating, favoring the strategic orienta-
tion of one of the actors involved in the 
game. Depending on the strategic orien-
tation that prevails, LRA will be more or 
less favorable in terms of environmental 
protection. #ey will result in the imple-
mentation, diversion, circumvention, or 
development of legal rules and, as such, 
materialize a gap between these rules and 
environmental outcomes.
LAS in action: an empirical illus-
tration
The following sections illustrate the empirical relevance of the concept of LAS through the “thick anal-
ysis” (Adger et al. 2003) of a case study. 
A “case” is de!ned as a bounded empir-
ical phenomenon composed of “complex 
Table 2 Five ideal types of LAS
Passivity 
Strategy by which an actor chooses (or is constrained) not to act, that is 
not to activate or refer to a given rule (strategy of non-decision, 
Bachrach and Baratz 1963). 
Concretization 
Strategy by which an actor seeks to implement a rule as closely as 
possible to its formulation and its intent (i.e., strategy of 
implementation). 
Diversion Strategy by which an actor seeks to activate a rule to other ends than what the rule is intended for (Lascoumes 1990, 56). 
Circumvention 
Strategy by which an actor resists to the implementation of a given rule, 
either by invoking another rule (confrontation, Aubin 2011) or by 
assuming that its behavior will not be punished (circumvention “en 
règle”, Bourdieu 1986). 
Innovation 
Strategy by which an actor seeks to develop an ad hoc, tailor-made 
solutions to address an environmental issue on the ground, going 
beyond what is provided for in legal rules. 
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con!gurations of events and structures” 
(Ragin 2000, 57). In casu, the case is delin-
eated by the environmental policymaking 
process related to the issue of aquatic eco-
system protection in Valais (Switzerland). 
#is case was selected because it deals 
with a situation where there is a clear and 
recognized gap between a formal rule 
(obligation to remediate watercourses in 
order to protect aquatic ecosystem) and 
an incongruent environmental outcome 
(no change in water $ows and ecosystem 
protection). It represents, therefore, an 
original empirical contribution that is of 
particular interest to study the interplay 
between legal rules, actors’ behaviors, and 
environmental outcomes.
 #e case study traces the social 
process (Hall 2008) and mechanisms 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010) by which 
this environmental outcome occurred. 
#e framework developed in Figure 1 
around the notion of LAS is applied. It di-
rects toward a three-folded research pro-
tocol: (1) competing interests around the 
construction of the problem; (2) political 
games and LAS; (3) LRA and environ-
mental outcomes. #e following sections 
are organized according to this protocol, 
which also orientated data collection and 
interpretation.
 Data collection involved a polit-
ico-legal screening of media and o%cial 
documents (legislation, reports from the 
administration, actors’ statements). In 
addition, !eld visits to local withdrawals 
and about 15 in-depth semi-structured 
interviews were conducted between 2011 
and 2013 with representatives of cantonal 
services, local authorities, and social ac-
tors. #e relevant actors were identi!ed by 
using a snowball sampling approach (Pat-
ton 1990), i.e., by progressively construct-
ing the sample through the networks and 
relations of previous interviewees. #ese 
sources were then analyzed and triangu-
lated in order to confront the divergences 
between actors and produce a sound and 
precise reconstruction of the processes at 
play. An intermediary case study report 
was also submitted to the interviewees in 
order to validate, enrich, and/or qualify 
the !ndings.
Competing interests around the construc-
tion of the problem
 Water is a resource whose eco-
nomic importance is crucial for the can-
ton of Valais, which is situated at the heart 
of the Alps, around the Rhône upstream 
river basin. Both the Rhône and its tribu-
tary watercourses provide a wide range of 
services to the population: many sources 
are used for drinking water; withdrawals 
for irrigation have been operated for cen-
turies and are protected by a rare form of 
private water rights (immemorial water 
rights); and an impressive number of con-
cessions for hydropower production have 
been granted since the adoption of the 
federal Water Rights Act (WRA) in 1916. 
#ese human activities have tremendous 
implications for the living environment 
that water represents for plants and an-
imals, which has been under both qual-
itative (increased pollution levels) and 
quantitative (insu%cient residual $ows) 
threats (Federal Council 1987). In Valais, 
it is not rare for watercourses to see their 
$ow substantially reduced. Even in a place 
o&en depicted as the water tower of Eu-
rope, a dried-out river can be a reality.
 Switzerland revised its Water Pro-
tection Act (WPA) in 1991 in order to 
protect aquatic ecosystem from such sit-
uations. All substantially a"ected water-
courses should have been remediated by 
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cantonal authorities before 2012 (art. 80 
WPA, which leaves some $exibility as to 
the exact nature and extent of the reme-
diation measures). Yet, in Valais, nothing 
has changed (Federal O%ce for the En-
vironment, 2013). Clearly, the revision 
of the WPA did not lead to a political 
consensus around the problem. To the 
contrary, its recognition has met—and 
continues to meet—strong competing in-
terests.
 On the one hand, the WPA cer-
tainly contributed to put the problem 
on the political agenda by forcing the 
cantonal administration to do “some-
thing”—at least to take position. #e issue 
is also recognized by social actors on the 
ground, in particular by environmental 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
and !shermen associations. On the other 
hand, aquatic ecosystem protection faces 
strong competing interests. Hydropower 
production enjoys, !rst, a positive image. 
It represents a safe and green source of 
energy, bene!ting from a strong politi-
cal consensus at the federal and canton-
al levels—even more in a context where 
Switzerland decided, in 2011, to withdraw 
progressively from the use of nuclear en-
ergy. In parallel, irrigation represents 
another important water use. Speci!c to 
the Valais with regards to their economic 
and symbolic importance (traditional wa-
ter channels—bisses—are considered as 
part of the cantonal heritage), irrigation 
withdrawals are numerous in lateral wa-
tercourses (Federal O%ce for Agriculture 
2007).
Political games and LAS
 #e processes that arose around 
the issue of aquatic ecosystem protection 
are indivisible from these complex trade-
o"s. #ey took place both within and at 
the margin of an inter-services working 
group established by the cantonal admin-
istration in order to elaborate a consensu-
al remediation plan. #e di"erent interests 
at play were reproduced in the con$icting 
views of the cantonal services that were 
invited to take part to this working group: 
the service of environmental protection 
(SPE), the service of energy and hydro-
power forces (SEFH), and the service of 
agriculture (SCA). Each pursued what 
they claimed to be the prevailing pub-
lic interest, and promoted it by adopting 
what was perceived as the most appro-
priate and legitimate LAS. In parallel, so-
cial actors that shared the same interests 
(environmental NGOs and !shermen as-
sociations, hydropower companies, and 
farming associations) have been more or 
less active in promoting their worldviews, 
in parallel or in close collaboration with 
these services. #e three groups of actors 
that emerged from this speci!c con!gura-
tion, as well as the LAS they pursued, are 
described below:
 Environment: the SPE took an 
active part to the inter-services working 
group. It promoted the implementation of 
strong remediation measures, in line with 
the requirements of the WPA. #e goal 
was to reach a satisfying level of protec-
tion for aquatic ecosystem by requiring 
minimal water $ows downstream of im-
portant withdrawals (measures of water 
endowments). #e LAS adopted by the 
SPE was one of concretization of the WPA. 
However, because the SPE was political-
ly isolated and lacked the resources to 
pursue its strategy (in terms of personal, 
political support, and information about 
the withdrawals), it faced di%culties to 
impose its view within the inter-services 
working group.
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 In parallel, environmental NGOs 
and !shermen associations pursued a sim-
ilar strategy, although more o"ensively. 
#ey orientated their actions around two 
axes: communication in the media (focus-
ing on the impacts of hydropower produc-
tion) in order to re-a%rm the importance 
of the issue and to maintain some level 
of social pressure; and, when it was clear 
that the remediation measures that had 
been adopted would be insu%cient, judi-
cialization of the policymaking processes 
through the activation of their right to ap-
peal (granted by art. 55 of the federal En-
vironment Protection Act, EPA).
 Energy: the SEFH played a key role. 
It drove and coordinated the inter-services 
working group and, by doing so, con-
trolled both the timing of the procedure 
and the technical information needed for 
the elaboration of remediation measures. 
#e goal it pursued was two-folded. First, 
it is apparent that the service aimed at de-
laying the implementation of the WPA, 
in particular through the elaboration of a 
complex web of intermediary policy deci-
sions (a directive in 2002, a remediation 
plan in 2008, and numerous feasibility 
studies and intermediary reports). Sec-
ond, it pushed toward weak remediation 
measures in order to avoid a loss of pro-
duction for hydropower companies (mea-
sures of coordination, construction, or ex-
ploitation rather than measures requiring 
speci!c water endowments). In the pur-
suit of this strategy, the SEFH worked in 
close collaboration with hydropower com-
panies, which were for instance responsi-
ble for mandating and !nancing feasibility 
studies.
 Totally congruent with the polit-
ically supported view in the canton, this 
course of action can be quali!ed as a LAS 
of minimal concretization. #e SEFH did 
not try to resist openly to the implemen-
tation of remediation measures (which 
would have constituted a LAS of circum-
vention), but sought to reduce their im-
pacts by pro!ting from the $exibility that 
the WPA let to cantonal authorities with 
regards to the nature of the remediation 
measures.
 Agriculture: the SCA refused to 
participate in the inter-services working 
group. It argued that irrigation withdraw-
als should be given absolute priority over 
other water uses (including living envi-
ronment) for three main reasons: their 
destination (food production), their legal 
protection (“immemorial water rights”, 
recognized by the Swiss Civil Code), and 
their allegedly low impacts on watercours-
es. According to this interpretation, reme-
diation measures were not applicable to 
irrigation and the service was not required 
to take part in their elaboration.
 By doing so, the SCA pursued a 
LAS of circumvention by confrontation, 
i.e. by invoking another formal rule. In 
more details, the service resisted to the 
implementation of the WPA by claiming 
the absolute priority of immemorial water 
rights. #is interpretation is, however, in-
consistent with the dominant and legally 
approved de!nition, which considers un-
ambiguously that irrigation withdrawals 
are also subject to remediation measures 
(Largey 2013). Although this strategy did 
not bene!ciate from the support of other 
actors, it was never frontally put into ques-
tion. #e SCA managed to take bene!t 
from the complex implementation context 
and from the over-mediatization of hydro-
power production to put irrigation at the 
second level. As a result, other agricultural 
circles never felt the need to act and could 
remain out of the game (LAS of passivity).
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 #e LRA that emerged from this 
speci!c con!guration of actors, power 
relations, and LAS are structured into 
two phases. In a !rst time (t1), the LRA 
was largely congruent with the dominant 
strategy of minimal concretization pro-
moted by the SEFH. A cantonal reme-
diation plan was adopted in 2008, but it 
contained very few measures of water en-
dowments. Several feasibility studies were 
conducted by hydropower companies, 
and validated through a series of inter-
mediary decisions. At the end of the im-
plementation period (December 2012), 
however, only 12 !nal decisions had been 
adopted and a single one had actually 
been executed. Practically nothing had 
changed on the ground (both for hydro-
power and irrigation withdrawals); eco-
system protection had not been improved 
(absence of environmental outcomes).
 In a second time however (t2), fol-
lowing the legal appeals of environmen-
tal NGOs (11 out of the 12 !nal decisions 
had been attacked), the whole implemen-
tation scheme was put into question. Two 
judgments from the Valais cantonal court, 
inspired by a verdict of the Swiss federal 
court concerning another canton, were 
adopted in November and December 
2012. #e cantonal court estimated that 
the prescribed remediation measures were 
not ambitious enough and, more particu-
larly, that measures of water endowment 
were to be favored (Largey 2013).
 #ese judgments forced the can-
tonal authorities to review the up-to-then 
favored strategy. An internal document 
produced by the SEFH in March 2013 
took note of the decisions and proposed 
to adapt the remediation plan. #e policy-
making process entered, in other words, 
in a new phase that was not investigated 
as part of this case study.
Discussion and Conclusion
Contributions to environmental policy 
analysis
The framework developed in the present research proved to be a powerful tool to understand how a 
speci!c set of legal rules and LAS, a con-
$icting social construction of the problem 
and a subtle repertoire of political games 
interacted to produce a questionable out-
come in terms of environmental protec-
tion. Figure 2 o"ers a synthetic repre-
sentation of the interplay between these 
variables.
 #is process represents a classical 
example of implementation de!cit, where 
a clear gap is observed between a legal rule 
(art. 80 WPA) and an outcome. In such 
a case, most environmental governance 
scholars would have highlighted the ne-
cessity to move beyond traditional forms 
of government by designing more collab-
orative or $exible policy instruments. As 
for implementation scholars, their atten-
tion would have been on increasing goal 
compliance by identifying what should 
have happened and the administrative 
factors that prevented it from happening. 
IAD-related approaches, !nally, would 
have provided deductive models of indi-
vidual decision making and developed 
principles for a better institutional design.
 #is process represents a classical 
example of implementation de!cit, where 
a clear gap is observed between a legal rule 
(art. 80 WPA) and an outcome. In such 
a case, most environmental governance 
scholars would have highlighted the ne-
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cessity to move beyond traditional forms 
of government by designing more collab-
orative or $exible policy instruments. As 
for implementation scholars, their atten-
tion would have been on increasing goal 
compliance by identifying what should 
have happened and the administrative 
factors that prevented it from happening. 
IAD-related approaches, !nally, would 
have provided deductive models of indi-
vidual decision making and developed 
principles for a better institutional design.
 None of them would have, how-
ever, accounted for the strategies adopt-
ed by the actors with regards to the rules 
that structure their action. By drawing 
attention to this intrinsically political di-
mension, the framework developed in the 
present research complements the three 
above-mentioned analyses and could in-
form their recommendations. #e case 
study emphasized, in particular, how the 
co-action of a complex context of legal 
rules, on the one hand, and of political 
interactions between intentional actors, 
on the other hand, led to the observed 
(absence of) environmental outcomes. 
In summary, neither rules (structure) nor 
actors’ actions (agency) appeared, taken 
independently, su%cient to explain the 
outcomes of the processes at play. Institu-
tional structures did not impinge on en-
vironmental outcomes deterministically, 
while actors’ agency was clearly situated.
Figure 2 Application of the framework to the case of aquatic 
ecosystem protection in Valais
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 In that respect, LAS proved to be 
useful mechanisms to investigate “struc-
ture in relation to action and action in 
relation to structure” (Jessop 2001, 1223). 
In the case under study, the careful iden-
ti!cation of LAS revealed how legal rules 
(the WPA and WRA, but also procedur-
al rules and property right regimes) ma-
terialized into actors’ interactions. #ese 
interactions led to a speci!c LRA, from 
which a gap between art. 80 WPA and en-
vironmental outcomes emerged. By doing 
so, LAS allowed to move the notion of in-
stitutions from “abstract entities” (Peters 
2011, 38) to more operational constructs 
coming into life in actors’ every-day life. 
#e notion of LAS provided, in sum, an 
operational typology to make the link-
age between legal rules and political be-
haviors explicit as well as an empirically 
robust social mechanisms through which 
the in$uence of these rules on environ-
mental outcomes is mediated.
 #ree complementary !ndings are 
related to this. #e case study highlighted, 
!rst, the complex con!guration of legal 
rules that impinged on the course of ac-
tion. It con!rmed the existence of inco-
herencies among these rules (Gerber et al. 
2009), as well as of confrontations in their 
activation (Aubin 2011)—echoed, in casu, 
by the strategy of the SCA (activation of 
immemorial water rights to oppose the 
concretization of the WPA). Clearly, 
property rights have to be taken into ac-
count when designing policies. #e case 
also underlined the interplay between 
substantial and procedural rules (Knoep-
fel et al. 2011), and the central in$uence 
of the latter in the concretization of the 
former. #e procedural rule conferring a 
right to appeal to environmental NGOs 
(art. 55 EPA) appeared, in particular, as 
an essential component of the Swiss envi-
ronmental policy scheme. #e concretiza-
tion of this rule allowed NGOs to bypass 
an unfavorable con!guration of actors 
and power distribution to seek for more 
ambitious environmental outcomes. #e 
reinforcement of such procedural instru-
ments may, thus, appear as a promising 
path to empower environmental NGOs.
 Second, the adoption of a bot-
tom-up orientation stressed the necessity 
to examine the construction of the prob-
lem at the level of action. #e analysis 
showed how the phase of agenda setting 
that had occurred at the federal level had 
to be repeated at the cantonal level for col-
lective action to be actually engaged. In 
other words, the legal recognition of the 
problem did not mechanically lead to its 
transposition at the level of action. Quite 
the opposite, the transposition proved to 
be particularly disputed, re$ecting the 
contradictions intrinsic to the conduct of 
public action. Aquatic ecosystem protec-
tion involved a wide range of actors, all of 
them defending presented-as-primordial 
public interests. #ese trade-o"s fostered 
instability in the de!nition of the prob-
lem, whose intensity was continually put 
into question. One of the main concerns 
for the SPE and the environmental NGOs 
was, in this context, to rea%rm the impor-
tance of the issue with regards to the other 
public interests at stake. #e construction 
of the problem proved to be, in sum, of 
high strategic signi!cance.
 Finally, the present research con-
!rmed that the game metaphor is a pow-
erful analytical tool to make the actorial 
driving forces of environmental policy-
making explicit. #e con!guration of ac-
tors, power relations, and strategies spe-
ci!c to the canton of Valais—i.e., the three 
variables inherent to the game image—
appeared to be crucial in explaining the 
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(absence of) environmental outcomes. 
#eir sound analysis contributed to pro-
vide a more nuanced understanding of 
the processes at play, beyond any forms of 
de-politicization (Swyngedouw 2009) or 
institutional determinism (Radaelli, Den-
te, and Dossi 2012). #e game metaphor 
emphasized the central role of actors’ in-
teractions in shaping environmental out-
comes and highlighted the predominance 
of confrontational politics over collabora-
tion or learning. #e inter-services work-
ing group acted, in particular, more as an 
arena to produce an apparent consensus 
around the dominant strategy than as a 
device of collaboration toward more le-
gitimate environmental outcomes.
Conclusion and future research avenues
 #is article focused on the gaps 
that emerge between legal rules and en-
vironmental outcomes. #e main analyt-
ical claim was to a%rm that these gaps 
would better be seen as the results of 
political processes, within which actors 
adopt competing strategies with regards 
to the rules that structure their action. To 
that end, the social mechanism of LAS 
has been developed, embedded within 
a broader analytical framework, and ap-
plied to a case study.
 By doing so, the research o"ers 
an approach to organize and systematize 
the analysis of the interplay between le-
gal rules, political behaviors and environ-
mental outcomes. #e focus on LAS, rath-
er than ignoring or hiding dynamics of 
power, contributes to reveal them. Not all 
actors were, in the case study, equal in the 
pursuit of their strategy. In the end, a very 
subtle repertoire of political games was 
highlighted and the analysis demonstrat-
ed how politics never end, and how actors 
always try to reformulate the modalities 
of collective action. All in all, the research 
speaks in favor of a more political and in-
tegrative approach to environmental pol-
icymaking and provided a promising tool 
in that goal.
 #e present paper opens up, how-
ever, more avenues for research than it 
closes. It privileges a general conceptu-
alization to a more parsimonious focus, 
an illustrative empirical application to a 
comparative research design. If, by doing 
so, it makes a generalization potential to 
most environmental problems plausible, 
it leaves the question of its application 
to other policy domains open; if it illus-
trates the explanatory potential of LAS, 
it does not allow deducting more speci!c 
regularities. It would thus be necessary, 
in order to strengthen the robustness of 
the newly developed LAS approach, to 
conduct more research on this concept. 
Future research could, for instance, fo-
cus on LAS in other highly topical poli-
cy sectors such as social, immigration, or 
energy policies. It could also aim at pro-
posing more deductive research design 
by testing, for instance, hypotheses on the 
link between $exibility and implementa-
tion or, to the contrary, between rigidity 
and circumvention. Finally, it would also 
be interesting to explore LAS in an inter-
disciplinary perspective, for instance by 
exploring the sociological and psycholog-
ical variables that in$uence the selection 
of a given LAS.
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